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THERANKING
ENVIITONMENT

recycling the saving in the
economy. lts other role is the
provisions of the mechanism
whereby money is transferred
within the domestic economy
and to and from other currency centres to settle innport and
export bills.

Banks exercise a degree of
economic power, notably by
their choice of assets in which
they place the disposable portion of the funds deposited
with them. By their decision
to lend to one customer and
not another, whatever the
criteria, they otrviously assist
to determine the allocation of
scarce real resources; in other
words, what will or will not be

Therefore, this paper begins
with a review of main streams
of banking business to 1969,
the year the Monetary Policy
Circular No. 1, entitled "Central Bank of Nigeria Credit
Guidelines tor 1969170" was
issued. The second phase of
review will be the period
ending in 1976, the year the
Federal Military Government
bought into certain banks. The

You would observe that Nigeria is attempting to transform
herself into an industrial urban
society, which should be able
to feed herself and produce
raw rnaterials for her mills.
This will be done by making
the necessary adjustment from
an oil economy to a diversified
one. Banks have a crucial role
to play not only in the ultimate achievement of this objective but rrpre importantly
how speedily and efficiently it
is achieved. The purpose of this
paper is to attempt to present
the bank credit and operating
policies that are essential and
desirable for forstering economic developrnent in Nigeria.
It is pointless to approach
the isue by reopening the
abstract arguments for and
against public ownership of
banks, an issue which is temporarily and certainly only
partially settled by the acquisition of shares in certain
banks by the Federal Military
Government to bring the indigenous equity holdings in
them to 60%. Rather, a pragmatic approach which gives
due weight to historical experience would be adopted in
the process of examinirg whether or not the banks have
acted too much irresponsibly
in purzuit of private profit and
aiming for a banking elysium
where risk was banished and
business failures no more than
a bad dream, all to the detriment of National economic

review some criticis:ms of

During this period, a Merchant Bank and an lndustrial
and Development Bank, both
of which were not then of
much consequence to economic development joineC in the
business of banking. Credit
policies of banks up to 1969
encouraged ubriddled support
to non-productive sectors,
particularly, finance of import
bills, irrespective of the nature
of imports. These were based
on the orthodox principle of

produced.

development.

third and f inal

phage will

banks and present, a proposal

for reform with the objective
of having in the 80s a banking

system that relates our credit
and operational policies and
techniques to the conditions
of a rapidly changing economy.
PHASE 1 - Period up to 1969
ln this country, more than
in other countries, particularly
Britain with developed financial system, from where banking is mostly received into this

country, Commercial

Banks

derived their economic powers
from the complementary roles
of mobilising savings, suitable

i
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lending short, a principle
which was considered very
prudent, having regard to their
funding base.

Principal banks, notably the
expatriate ones, concentrated
their operations in the main
commercial cities and most in
the hands of the international
companies, from which they
derived nearly all their profits.

There

as no

geographical
\
spread out or diversification of
their assets to include serious
industrial lendings or serious

lendings to the indigenous
enterprises, which are mostly
in the small scale and medium
size brackets. The indigenous
banks, which sprang up, were
left to fill the vacuum created
by courting the indigenous
business and opening up offices in the less commercial centres, the twin factors which
later beconr their strength
and the cause of their weakness. Consequently, they were
faced with high operating
costs, including huge writeoffs, coupled with very meagre
income, mainly derived from
interest on. loans and advances
whereas the bulk of bank incomes has always been derived
from businesses offering transfer and other charges, which
were almost the preserves of
the top league expatriate controlled banks.
Savings mobilised in Nigeria

by the

Post Office Savings

Bank (now the Federal Savings
Bank) urere invested abroad by
1
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design, although, these savings

the most suitable for
medium and long term lending
a case of carrying coal to New'
castle. The investment of the
savings mobilised by the Commercial Banks followed the
seasonal pattern of the economy. During off-season, the
funds were invested in sterling
securities in the United Kingdom while they would be repatriated during produce seasons to meet local needs.
Banking business was unregulated in any form until the
enactment of the first legislation, the Banking Ordinance
1952. That ordinance, like the
subsequent legislations, was
designed to protect the depositors by means of setting out
systems of licensing, minimum
capitalisation, liquidity ratio,
maintenance of reserves and
Bank supervision and regulation.
The determination in to neu

were

tralise, as much as possible,
the defects inherent in a colonial and dependent Ceveloping
economy, with a view to localising the control of credit,
resulted in establishment, in
1958, of the Central Bank of
Nigeria. The Central Bank of
Nigeria, which was superimposed on the existing financial
institutions was designed to
direct the banking industry
towards the achievement of
national economic oblectives.
This singular step produced
many results. The Nigerian
currency system was evolved,
investments of funds of public

institutions in the United
Kingdom were amended and
redirected, the management of
the nation's foreign exchange
reserves was vested in the Central Bank of Nigeria, Exchange
Control Act 1962, and subsequent amendments, regulate
the movement of funds in and
out of the Country and the
Lagos Stock Exchange Act of

1961 was enacted. While this
single act offered the indigenous banks the opportunity
of operating under a well-defined body of regulations geared
towards their safety and the
protection of depositors, as
well as sound banking supervision and examination, the

expatriate banks were being
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constantly required to adapt
their operations to local needs
and seek out and use local investment o utlets for their
resources. Nothwithstanding
all these, because the exPatria-

Monthly Staternent of
Assets and Liabilities.

Second Schedule:

Report on Loans and Advances, indicating under
sub-headingS,

to be outposts of their home based
baks, both in law and in fact,
their responsibilities were to

te

banks continued

their

head-quarters,

sustained determination to
reduce the dependence of this
economy on outside economies by having a measure of
control on companies oPerating here and under our own
laws, resulted, to the astonishrnent of its antagonists, the
enactment and successful execomPanies

Decree 1968, which obliged all
companies operating in Nigeria
to register as Nigerian ComPa-

nies under Nigerian ComPanY

"Banks were obliged to render
to the Central Bank of Nigeria

periodic returns in standard
forms to enable the Central
Bank of Nigeria to perform
its supervisory roles.

"

ged to take out local incorPoration. The noose was further
tightened up yet by a further
fiat which found expression in
the Banking Decree 1969. The

timing of this latter act

and
the obligations therein empha-

the determination of the
authorities to evolve a banking
system that will be responsive
to our needs. Banks nere obliged to render to the Central
sise

of

N

igeria

period ic

returns in standard forms to
enable the Central Bank of
Nigeria to perform its supervisory roles.
The returns are:
First Schedule:

Third Schedule:
Layout, form, antl elernents
of Balance Sheet and Proft
and Loss Accounts.
Fourth Schedule:
lVlatters to be expresslY stated in auditor's report and

F

ifth Schedule:
Auditor's analysis of Doubtful Advances.

ln spite of all these gains and
tightening up of the noose, the
banks, particularly the expatriate ones, continued to base
their credit decisions on factors outside this economy.
Not only was there a decline
in the aggregate of loans, and
advances to private sector in

the

signif

economy, there was

icant and

a

substantial

decline in credits to agricultural, mining, manufacturing and

of the economy. Since it was realised
tlrat allocation of credits by
the banks according to profit
motive rryould frustrate the
real estate sectors

Law. Thus, the banks, like
other companies, were obli-

Bank

A, B, C, D,

respectively their
Sectorial, Liquidity, Security, Maturity and lVethod
of Repayment distributions.

wh ich

ordered operations within the
targets set rarorld-wide for all
overseas branches, irresPective
of the peculiarities of each and
distinct overseas country and
economic requirements. The

cution of the

and E.

monetary policy goal to
increase the productive capacimeet

ty of the economy to

domestic demand from' time

to time and produce surplus,
the Central Bank of Nigeria

initiated direct control of sectoral distribution of credit by
way of the issurance of monetary policy circu lars at the
beginning of each of f iscal
years from 1969/70. This is
the beginning of conscious
efforts to move the banks
away f rom their traditional
preference for short term lending and a reluctance to provide

transparently

medium/long

term credit necessary for the
rapid economic development
of the Country.
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PHASE

ll

- From 1970- 1976

During this period, some time
was devoted to t\,o extreme
views that the credit problems
would be solved if the expatriate banks wer€ nationalised
and that instead of nationali-

sing them, the Government

{

should set up its own banks, as
it happened in Ghana. The

protagonists of the former
maintained that if a developing country wants to engage in
effective planning, its public

sector has to embrace certain
strategic spheres of economic
activity. Otherwise, there
would be a serious dangeithat
its planning remains mainly on
paper. Banking is considered
to be one of these strategic
economic spheres which are
regarded as "commanding
heights" and which if not
drawn into the public sector,
would make impossible the
shapening of the destiny of
the economy. The antagonists
of this thesis pointed to the
inefficiency of the indigenous
banks, under indigenous managements, and followed up the
argument that the nationalisation of the expatriate banks
would produce a chaotic banking system and therefore recommend the continuation of
the dichotoml in banking.The
argument was eountered by
the protagonists of nationalisation, that judging from resour-

ces, both human and mate-

rials, internal and external
contacts, efforts, operating
negative factors, facing the industry, degree of monopolistic
powers enjoyed, the indigenous banks performed comparatively and relatively better
than their expatriate counter
parts.

Five points

rarere cited.
First, without effort, the expatriate banks derived their huge

income f rom the businesses
pushed their way by their
foreign friends uho are in control of the economy.

Second,
made

their

antecedence

it possible for them to

have cheap and steady deposit

base for their lending operations. Third, their clients, who
are mostly expatraate compaBANKING IN THE EIGHTIES

nies, have good

f

inancial

management unlike their
indigenous counterpart with
clients with poor management
which contributes to the proLilems

of the indigenous banks.

Fourth, the operative costs of

the expatriate banks relative
to their income is very low
and could therefore employ
good quality staff on better
terms and.

guide lines and other tools of
monetary policy. Therefore, as
a continuation of the evolution of the banking system,
the Federal Government in
1976, acquired enough shares
in all the licenced banks to
bring the indigenous participation to 60% with the right
to appoint the Chairmen of
the boards and certain number
of boarC members.
Possibly, being aware that
management of these
banks with expatriate Chief
Executives, would continue to

the
Fifth, their huge profits could
support huge writeoffs for
bad debt provision and other
losses, including those sustained as a result of fraud.

On the other hand, because
the indigenous banks operate

in mostly rural areas, they act
positively in developing banking habit in those areas irrespective of attendant high

costs.

The announcement in
1973, by the Federal Government of its decision to intervene more directly in commercial banking activities by
acquiring 40o/o of the equity of
the three largest expatriate
banks - Barclays Bank of Nigeria, Standard Bank, and Uni-

ted Bank for Africa, settled
the arguement if only for a
while. The aim of the participation, according to the

government, is for the government .to get intimately involved in commercial banking
activities so as to guide them
to operate to the maximum
benefit of the economy. This
is as much in their own interest as it is in the interest of
the country.
Consequently, Federal IVIili-

tary Government participated

in the management of the
three banks at the board level,
having appointed their Chairmen and some directors. As
this step did not produce the
expected change, it became
dawn on the authority that we
could not have a responsive
and purposeful banking system merely by the Federal
tMilitary Government's 40%
participation in the three
major expatriate banks, the
establishrnent of Merchant
Banks without clear corporate
policies, the use of credit

treat the Central Bank of

Nigeria guide lines as so many
pious wishes of the authority
and follow their own lines the
rnaximization of profit - the
trend is now for the post of
the Chief Executives of these
banks to be Nigerianised.
It appears that interplay of
various factors push banking

history in the Cirection of
those wtro were convinced
that banking should go public,
necesarily gradqally, if not at
one go.

PHASE !II
BLAME FOR BANKS

The main streams, as recounted above, of the development
of banking business, have not
exempted the banks from
criticism; initially from the indigenous business community
and now from the monetary
authorities and everybody.
The past five years have been
somewhat unusual, by compa
rison with previous post civil

war experience, beginning
with a rapid groMh of economic activity, in which preszures built up, which developed into an unusually high
rate of inflation.
One line

of

criticism

has

been that the activities of the
banks - particularly their lending - seriously contributed to

the situation. lt is suggested
that bank lending is too short

term and not suff iciently
directed towards the financing
of industrial investment (pro-

ductive sector) ; lend ing policies are based on factors outside this economy. Their lending policy diverted resources
9
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into the wrong places and in
particular was responsible for
the unprecedented high consumption of imported goods

within the last three years,
which exacerbated the inflationary pressure in the

economy. 1
Another criticism is that the
banks contributed to inflation

by not

stepping up savings
campaign. Yet another line of

criticism is that operational

standard has declined
ridiculous extent.

to

a

is time to examine the
justification or otherwise of
these criticisms.

The ultimate monetary policy goal of any economic entity is a financial system which
enables the economy to ope-

at an optimum

level.

Although this is an unattainable goal, persistent efforts are
usually made to move towards
the goal. One reading through
the Central Bank of Nigeria

Monetary Policy
Nos. 1

to

Cr'rculars

10 sees a monetary

policy goal trend emphasing
fast rate of economic growth
through the process of expansion of productive sectors.
Year in year out, the Governnor keeps on lamenting that
while credit allocation to
finance imports and domestic
trade has always been above
the desired proportion, credit
to Agricultural, Mining, Manufacturing and Real Estate sectors of the economy, which
constitute the productive
sector, has on the other hand
been below the desirable level.
As a result, the Government,
at the beginning of every fiscal
year, ilrges banks to increase
their credit supplies sufficiently to the productive sectors
of the economy while curbing
credit for consumption.
From the 67168 year to
1971172, the Central Bank of
Nigeria went about achieving
its goal through a credit policy
based on the fixing of credit
ceilings to a specified maximum percentage rise in each
sector, using as a base the posi-

See appendix one

for credit allocated to

productive sector and crb€ectors as

a

per centage of the aggregate credit granted as at the end of December of the

1o

years 1972

to 1977...

eoNrrNc
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as at the end
vious fiscal year.

of the pre-

From 1972173 year, there

was an alteration in credit con-

trol pattern. From that year,

loans and advances were to be
channelled to the various sectors of the economy in such a
way that by the end of the f is-

cal year the distribution of
loans and advances in the
various sectors of the economy shall be as specif ied at the
beginning of the relevant f iscal
year.

It

rate

tion

From 1976177 year, while
still keeping specified proportional sectoral d istribution,
ceilings were reimposed on the
percentage by wh ich the aggregate loans and advances could
expand during, the fiscal year,
using the amount at the end of
the provious year as a base.

One may want to look into
why it has not been possible
for the bank to achieve the
sectoral balance stipulated'.
Essentially, credit to the
productive sector is of a
medium to long term nature
(say between 3 and 7 years)
and the risk involved calls for
a special form of assessment.

It is suggested that bank lending is too short in term and

not sufficiently d irected

towards the financing of industrial investment (productive sector).
Banks argue that theY cannot
see a need for this criticism
considering that banking Pru-

dence calls for

reasonable

maturity matching

between
their assets (mostly loans and
advances) and liabilities (mostly demand and short term

deposits). They are quick to
direct the attention of their
critics to interest and liquiditY
risks inherent in industrial
term lending. They regard new
entrepreneurs and their projects as credit risks which they
are not lil<ely able to hanCle.

They see Merchant Sanks as
specialist lenders whose
preserves are medium and long
term credit market.
Their critics in turn directed
them to the following points:
Bank lending policy as practiced in this country is a reflection of the lending policy in
the United Kingdom from

the

where banking business was
substantially imported to this
country and has not taken sufficient notice of the economic
setting in this country, which
is different from that of the
United Kingdom.

ln the United Kingdom,
banks are not repositories of
long term savings. Life lnsurance Companies, which are
the repositories of long term
savings and the money market
are well developed.

The bulk of the liability of
the commercial banks is demand and seven day call deposits which are volatile.

ln Nigeria, the life assurance
business is not yet well developed and the commercial

banks are the repositories of
long term savings, with a high
aggregate hard core, a type
that is useful for long term
investment. For example, the
more direct involvement of
German Banks in German ln-

dustry owes something to

their relatively severe f inancial
tribulations in the intenvar
inflation and depression, and
the under-development of her
life insurance business explains

much of the greater role played there by banks like the
Nigerian situation, as repositories of long term savings.
The other point about systems imported from the United Kingdom is the criticism
made there of their own system. "[\4e too" is a basis for
reform'.

for Reform
At this stage of their evolution, commercial banks cannot
validly claim that they lack deposit base to finance rnedium
and long term lendings. They
are the repositories of the bulk
of the savings mobilised in this
economy. All they need do is
Proposals

to

re-allocate their resources
produce the prescribed distribution of their loan portfolio.
The Merchant Banks can argue
from a position of strength
that lending operations can be
very vulnerable for them unless their funding mixes and

to

strategies change.

The Commercial Banks have

always been an important
though a declining source of
funds for them.

THE BANKING ENVIRONMENT

Merchant. Banks buy all
their rnoney; any interest free demand deposit has a real,

if hidden, cost. The ability to
zuccessfully reduce funding
costs is particularly important
in an environment where profits from the assets side of the
balance sheet is eroding.

The erosion will result from
increased competitive pressures on interest spreads as a
result of less lendings to nonproductive sectors. There are
two risks association with funding decisions, the market risk
which refers to the risk that
interest rates for assets and
liabilities of imperfectly mat
ched maturities will move over
time in directions which will
affect interest differential
income adversely.

It is important to note that
in the market risk area, it is

the repricing date rather than
the repayment maturity that is
relevant. lf an advance can be
repriced every three or six
months in line with prevailing
market interest rates, the fact
tlrat the loan might be outstanding for 10 years has no
bearing.

ln a normal market environment the yield curve slopes
upward as the maturity period
lengthens. There is a rational
temptation to borrow short
and lend lcng which is commonly known as "riding the
yield curve". But this introduces risks. Today's short term
interest rates may be lower
than todays long term interest
rates. Tomorrow, however, the

whole yield curve may shift
upwards and short term interest rates may rise above the
long term rates at which the
funds are from today. The
profit consequences of a major
shift in rates on a heavily mismatched assets/liability repricing position can be extremely
serious.

This was the bane of many
secondary banking institutions
particularly United Dominions

Trust Limited, in the United

Kingdom during the secondary
banking crisis of 1974175.
The Central Bank of Nigeria
policy to peg the interest rate
chargeable to agricultural and
BANKING IN THE EIGHTIES

real estate sub-sectors is capable of producing the opposite
of the desired rezult.
The rate applicable here is
fixed at 60/o per annum, whereas cost of 3 month money is
approaching 6.5% per annum.
The tendency is for the banks
to limit lending in this area to
the prescribed minumum per
centage of the aggregate loans
and advances. This is the general trend in the mortgage
market. The other day, one of

my

lnsurance f riends said,
would be doing a lot more
mortgage lending if the interest ceiling were more realistic" This factor is probably
responsible for the plight of
Mortgage Bank which I understand has found it uneconomic
to borrow from the market to
finance its lending operations.
It would have been enough for
the authority to fix the maximum lending rate to the preferred sector while another
maximum rate is fixed for the
less preferred sector. This is
the only way rvhereby resources would flow to those two
sub-sectors, agricultural and

We

real estate - f iat or credit guide
lines cannot do it alone. The

punitive measure of asking the
banks to deposit shortfall between their actual and prescribed lendings to this sectors
would produce administrative
problems and if such deposits
are finally not make available
to the related sub-setors is not
achieved.

There is the liquidity risl<
which may be defined as a
bank being unable to obtain
sufficient funds to cover its
needs, either from customers
or from the money market at
the market rates prevailing {or
the class of bank involved. The
extreme position exists when
adequate funds are not available from any sources at any
price. Under those circumstances, a bank would obviously
fail. This explains the need for
a lender of last report. ln the
resent past, the Central Bank
of Nigeria had to rescue t\^ro
indigenous banks that ran into
liquidity problems. Empirically, no bank structures the
maturities of its liabilities
longer than the maturities of
its assets. As a result, most
lranks will generally have a

negative cash

term.

This

flcw in the short

negative cash
absolute
liquidity exposure. That liquidity exposure must then be
reviewed in the context of the
nature of the liability base.
There is a need to analyse
the stability and replaceability
of the liability base in order to
assess the amount of risk involved. There is a need also to
analyse the diversity of funding sources and broad market
shares. One has need also to
lool< at the behavioural characteristics of the various
types of funding sources and
the bank's relationship with
them. The more broadly based
f

low represents its

and more mutually

advanta-

the relationship is to
both the borrower and the
lender, the more stable the
funding from that source is
likely to be. To assist the
banks, particularly, the Merchant Banks to play active
geous

roles in medium/ long term
credit market, they would

need access to the funds with
Financial lnstitutions like
National Provident Fund .and
Federal Savings Bank, whose
funds are suitable for medium/
long term investment. Banks
should have automatic reciiscount facillities from Central
Bank of Nigeria on selected
projects. lt would be necessary
for the constitutions guiding
the operations of these institions to be overhauled to

allow for this kind of accommodation.

Savings

Commercial banks used to
compete fiercely for depostis
to $rpport their lending operations. But during the last four
fiscal years, a critical problem
was how to manage the surplus revenue from oil. The policy measures to contain infla-

tion

necessitated the need to
re-impose credit ceiling on the
bank aggregate lending limits.

This produced the result that
banks, without outlet for their
funds, adopted negative attitude to savings mobilisation.
The banks are now witnessing
a changed liquidity condition.
Like the tides, liquidity levels
in the system rise and fall in
cycles. lt has been very high
tide for sometime now with
t1
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ample liquidity, but now there

is an ebb from past levels.

Keeping this in mind, and recognising the existing presures

on deposits as a result of
which cost of deposit is rising,
I should warn the banks to
recognise the need not only
to step up their campaign for
deposits, but also improve the
existing sources. lntroduction
of rural banking is expected
to influence the level of aggregate savings in the economy.
It is expected that deposits in
the rural branches will exceed
the level of loans made, and
funds rnrould be transferred to
other parts of the economy
through f inancial

channels.

Generally, households save
more when they have profitable investment possibilities
and incentives played an im-

portant role

in

stimu lating

savings.

I upuld like to recommend
the following savings mobilisation strategies:
There is a need for a flexiple interest rate structure. The
current practice is f or the

to fix the minimum during a fiscal year at
the beginning of that f iscal
governrnent

year. The minimum prescribed
during 1978/79 fiscal year is
5Yo per annum, and only

applies

to

accounts with

savings deposits of not more
than Fd20,000. Although this

)

rate is meant to be minimum,
the commercial banks, left to
themselves raould never venture to alter the rates upwards;
rates are therefore not made
competitive. lf the desire is to
mobilise substantial voluntary
savings, there should be a
mechanism for reviewing interest rates from time to time
during any f iscal year to
reflect the market trend. Application of this rate to
accounts with savings deposits
of not more than t{20,000
appears to be regressive. Where
rates of inflation are above
15% - 306 per year, incentive

to

save

at very low interest

rates is also low.

The minimum rate of intetest payable on savings or any
12

so,n"'*c

rN THE ETGHTTES

other deposits might be linked
to minimum re-discount rate
so that a desired change in
rates can be initiated through
changes in the minimum rediscount rate. lf considered feasi-

ble, lottery schemes can be
attached to savings deposits to
promote additional interest in
voluntary savings. The key
element here is the attractiveness of the reward paid on

awaited Bankruotcy law urhich

savings.

Convenience,

liquidity,

and

security of the savings, however, strongly complement the
return paid. The existing chaotic situations in savings department of banks where clients
depositing or withdrawing
funds have to srueat it out is
not conducive to proper
savings mobilisation. Savings
departments are too large to
make for efficient handling of
transactions. The Central Bank
of Nigeria might want to consider relaxing its rules about
opening of branches especially
in the commercial centres.
Banks could be allowed to
open cash centres strictly

rneant

the people behind the project
and those who have responsibility for managing the project
There is no institutional
arrangenent so far to sieve
honest borrourcrs from those
with tendency for fraud. This
makes it difficult for banks to
come to early or any decision
to lend in certain circumstances. The Government must
therefore speed up the much

for

deposit

savings/
withdrawal transactions. ldeal-

ly, any

saver should not walk
more than a couple of hund-

red metres to reach a savings
bank or spend more than say
ten minutes before concluding
a transaction.
There is a need for Federal
Savings Bank to popularise its
activities in the rural areas to
supplement the rural bankinq
recently introduced. t{/hy
don't banks introduce mobile
savings bank, a brain child of
United Bank for Africa.
It might be considered to
tie a life insurance option to
savings deposits as in the case
of credit - savings cooperatives
in Latin America; a system
which has also been introduced by United Bank for Africa
Limited.
The Borroter
ln lndustrial lending, which
is essentially of at least medium term nature, npre than
any short term lending, nonquantifiable criteria weigh
very heavily. Among those
non-quantifaable factors are

will provide the means of ascertaining the degree of risk
involved in lending to a particular person. Undischarged
Bankrupts are usually not allowed to borrow without disclosing the fact that they are undischarged nor could they be
directors of companies. The
law will provide a basis for
determining the cause of the

bankruptcy

- whether it

was

design or due to ill-luck,
and events beyond the bankrupt's control.

by

Banking Posture

Another issue is the image

of bank officials. Banking

is a
respectable profession and can

only be madd respectable if
that profession has posture of
its ovrnr, that is, its own ethos.
For an example, Bankers are
known for their frugality, a
quality which qualifies them
as agents of depositories of

public funds. A state of affairs
where majority gf senior bank
officials live careless life does
not produce the right environ-

ment for banking

business.

Such epithets as

'Ololu'
(meaning possessor of brand
new notes) and "Currency
Controller" are not complimentary to bankers. The mass
character or posture of bank
officials should reflect the
attributes of their profession.
One wonders if it is not necessary therefore to make rnembership of the Nigerian lnstitute of Bankers obligatory for
anybody performing any executive function in a bank.
I understand that the council of the Nigerian lnstitute of
Bankers has set up a zub+ommittee to work on a sqgestd.
draft decree for regulating the
professional conduct of their
members. The passage of srch
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a fiat by the authority will
make the dlscipline of bank

ff.il

officials a matter for the coun-

cil of the Nigerian lnstitute of
Bankers. Without this, banking

profession cannot attain a respectable posture.

Banking

Operations/Public

Relation

I will now turn my attention to the much needed im-

in operations at
branch level. [Vlost of the chaotic situation at the branch
level is due to strained resources at the branches which
makes span of control of the
provement

"All I am saying, is that,
never was it more necessary
that it is today to relate our
lending policy to the conditions

of a

without tears.

Most of the

successful

frauds can be blamed on overburdened supervisory strength
at the branch level and nothing else. lt is observed that
there are more frauds in large
branches of banks than there
are in smaller branches, where
people work less under pressure.

Some of my banking friends
feel that computerisation will
assist to reduce the branch
congestion. This view must be
taken with a pinch of salt. ln
Nigeria, most transactions are

in cash or cheques across the
counter.

Although I believe in mechanisation, which should be
introduced in stages, what is

imnndiately required

is

a

situation wtrereby fevrrer cheques would pass across the
counter and the bulk of cheques transacted rrrould be
through the clearing system.
You cannot have this state of
affairs as far as the Government does not enforce the law
which makes the intentional
issuance of dud cheques a
criniinal act with heavy penalties.

ln addition, the rules
governing the presentation of
the annual accounts and their
auditing should be made stronger and the auditors should
have a responsibility to report
anything untouard to the
banking authority. A special

L
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rapidly changing

econonry, and to vigorously
police this policy."

Mr. S. O. Ogundipe,
General Manager

supervisors problematic. lf
more branches are allowed to
be opened in the cities, where
demand for banking services is

greatest, there would be
opportunities for banking

t

Nigerian Merchant Bank Ltd.

report on the bank and branch
internal control system should
be made obligatory as in the
case of auditor's analysis of
doubtful advances.
On a more serious note, if
need be, any licenced bank
which operates persistently
against the Central Bank of

Nigeria credit guide

lines,

because of its mad desire for
easy profit or fear of making

a bad judgement in

the
medium term loan market or
both should have its foreign
exchange dealing licence suspended for a period of three
to six rmnths as a punitive
measure. The fear of losing the
licence wrth the consequent
los of income from foreign
exchange transactions, the
major and most crucial source
of inconp for banks, can serve
as a deterrent.
CONCLUSION

Our monetary policy goal is

fast rate economic groMh
wh ich presuposes development

of small and medium size en-

terprises. Experience in economies similar to ours has shoram
that they cannot be developed
without planned re-allocation
of financial resources to them.
Productive Sectors require not
only new lending techniques,
but a great deal of local knowledge, and in many cases, the
ability to exercise relatively
strict collateral control.

Since I find it difficuli to
believe that this knowledge
can be properly developed at
the required speed by banks,
especially the new ones, opera-

ting thousands of miles outside their historical rnarket
place and under peculiar con-

ditions, I would like to urge
the Council of the Nigerian
lnstitute of Bankers, in cooperation with the lending
institutions in the medium to
long term loan market, to
develop lending techniques
and criteria apposite for our
economy.

All I am saying, is that,
never was it more necessary
than it is today to relate our
lending policy to the conditions

of a rapidly changing

economy, and to vigorously
police this policy.

And never were it more
to refer our techniques to the ultimate end for
necessary

which they should be used.
This is our economy; this is
our banking system, and this

is our chance to inf luence
economic trend. As responsible officials of our various institutions, we must endeavour
to pur$e all those things that
are noble in banking, not
minding whose horse is gored.
Shall we be able to rise to
the challenge of our times, and
will the right, reasonable and
effective nature
prwail?

of

banking
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